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Abstract
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markets. This paper theoretically investigates the effects of a legal deregulation of tem-
porary agency employment on wage setting and the employment structure in a unionized
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that there is a hump-shaped relationship between the degree of legal deregulation of tem-
porary agency employment and the rate of temporary employment used in the production
process. Temporary agency employment may even decrease despite its deregulation. Fur-
thermore, regular employment monotonically increases, while individual workers and labor
unions suffer from deregulation due to declining wages and a reduction in labor union’s
utility.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the use of temporary agency work has tremendously increased
in almost all OECD countries. For example, in Germany the number of temporary agency
workers increased sevenfold (Jahn & Weber, 2015). Even if the great recession starting
in 2007 led to a minor decrease in the agency work penetration rate, it resumed its up-
wards trend afterwards (Ciett, 2013). This increase was particularly supported by the
ongoing institutional deregulation of temporary work agencies aiming at the flexibility of
the countries’ labor markets. For instance, in Germany the deregulation of temporary
agency employment was part of the labor market reform “Agenda 2010” of the former
social-democratic chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der in 2003. The aim of increasing the at-
tractiveness of temporary employment was, next to other labor market instruments, to
reduce unemployment and increase flexibility. The political idea behind the deregulation
of temporary agency employment is to bring more people to work that are not able to
find a job in the regular labor market, e.g. long-term unemployed. By using temporary
workers in the production, firms may “test” the workers and, afterwards, convert their
employment relationship to regular employment. From the firm’s perspective, there are
various motives for using temporary agency workers in the production process (see, e.g.
Holst et al., 2010). One of them is that using temporary workers in the production allows
to easily adjust the workforce to uncertainty about future output levels, workforce fluc-
tuations, worker absence etc. since temporary workers are not covered by employment
protection (see Houseman, 2001; Ono & Sullivan, 2013). Another argument for replacing
regular by temporary workers is that the use of the latter may lead to cost savings and
increasing profits (see, e.g. Jahn & Weber, 2015).
In most European countries, wages are determined by collective bargaining agreements
between firms and labor unions. The use of temporary agency employment may lead
to a substitution of part of the regular workforce that is represented by the unions.
Thus, labor unions have to take the behavior of temporary agency employment into
account in the negotiation process. Otherwise, the firms’ increasing attractiveness of
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using temporary agency work may induce substantial replacement of regular employment
and, hence, deteriorate the labor unions’ position in the economy.
Despite the important role of labor unions in almost all European economies, up to now
there has been limited attention on the investigation of temporary agency employment
on labor union’s behavior. Beissinger & Baudy (2015) give a first theoretical contribution
analyzing the firm’s strategic use of potential temporary agency employment in the wage-
setting process to dampen labor union’s wage claims. However, the model neglects the
general equilibrium effects of increasing temporary agency employment. One of the main
arguments of opponents of temporary agency work is that ongoing labor market flexibility
leads to a change in the employment structure towards more precarious employment and
a decrease in union coverage. Thus, it is left to analyze the effects of temporary agency
work on overall employment and the employment structure in the economy in a dynamic
set-up.
To close this gap, we analyze the general equilibrium effects of temporary agency em-
ployment in a frictional labor market a` la Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
(2000). We assume that there are large firms producing differentiated goods with labor
being the only production factor. Workers can either be hired directly by the firms or,
alternatively, the firm may borrow workers from temporary employment agencies. Both
types of work are modeled as perfect substitutes. Regular workers are organized in firm-
level labor unions. Agencies are small (one-worker) and bargain individually with the
firm over the fee a firm has to pay for using temporary workers in its production. Using
this model framework, we are able to reveal the employment structure in the economy
and its adjustment to shocks like institutional changes in the regulation of temporary
work agencies. Furthermore, it is possible to analyze how union coverage in the economy
evolves and examine the flows in the different labor market states. Legal (de)regulation is
modeled by regulatory costs arising from institutional barriers like limitations regarding
the maximum period of assignment of temporary workers, re-employment bans, synchro-
nization bans or equal pay obligations for regular and temporary workers. Higher legal
regulation leads to increasing regulatory costs.
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The main result of the model is that there is a hump-shaped relationship between
temporary agency employment used in the production and its degree of legal deregulation.
At first sight, this may be counterintuitive as it means that progressive legal deregulation
does not inevitably lead to an increase in temporary employment but it may even decline.
Furthermore, regular employment monotonically increases in deregulation of temporary
employment. Thus, there is no reduction in the degree of union coverage but, on the
contrary, it even increases. Unions and single workers both suffer from temporary agency
employment due to declining wage rates and labor union utility.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief discussion of related
literature on labor unions and temporary agency employment. Section 3 describes the
outline of the model and its components in more detail before the model is solved in
Section 4. Section 5 defines the equilibrium. In Section 6, the model is calibrated to
German data and its predictions considering the employment structure in the economy
are presented. Section 7 examines the key insights of the model, i.e. the changes in the
wage-setting and employment structure triggered by legal deregulation of the temporary
employment sector. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Related Literature
Before the model will be elaborated, a short review of related literature on labor unions
and temporary employment agencies will be given. Even if the behavior of labor unions
has already been widely discussed (for an overview see Booth, 1995; Boeri et al., 2001;
Addison & Schnabel, 2003), little attention was paid on modeling unionized labor markets
in the framework of search and matching for a long time. A first contribution to labor
unions in the matching framework was given by Delacroix (2006). He introduces a multi-
sectorial model with a varying degree of union coverage and monopolistic competition in
the goods market and investigates the union’s reaction to changes in the unemployment
insurance. Based on this framework, Ebell & Haefke (2006) study the effect of prod-
uct market deregulation on the formation of labor unions by endogenizing the choice of
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the bargaining institution. Krusell & Rudanko (2012) analyze the intertemporal effect
of unions’ commitment to future wages, while Bauer & Lingens (2013) investigate the
efficiency in search models with large firms and collectively bargained wages. In another
recent contribution, Ranjan (2013) examines the general equilibrium effects of decreas-
ing offshoring costs. He identifies a non-monotonic relationship of unemployment and
offshoring costs in the domestic, offshoring country. Decreasing costs of offshoring in-
crease unemployment first, but a further reduction leads to a decrease in unemployment
afterwards.
Theoretical work on temporary agency employment is rather limited. The very first
theoretical contributions are given by Autor (2001, 2003). While the first paper investi-
gates the role of employment agencies in the screening for regular jobs, the latter describes
that firms relinquish to substitute the whole workforce by temporary agency employment
due to distinct capital investments related to specific workers. The first contribution to
temporary agency employment in the framework of search and matching is provided by
Neugart & Storrie (2006). The authors analyze the increase of temporary employment
based on an improved matching efficiency that is induced by temporary work agencies
working as intermediaries in the matching process of workers and firms. Baumann et al.
(2011) use the same framework enriching the model set-up by endogenous job destruction.
However, the majority of research on temporary agency employment is based on its empir-
ical investigation and focuses on its strategic use in the production (e.g. Vidal & Tigges,
2009; Holst et al., 2010), its effect on the employment structure (Jahn & Bentzen, 2012;
Haller & Jahn, 2014), the wage differential of temporary agency work (Garz, 2013) and
the question if temporary agency employment may be used as a stepping stone into regular
employment (e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008; Kvasnicka, 2009; Autor & Houseman,
2005, 2010; Jahn & Rosholm, 2013, 2014).
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3 Outline of the Model
3.1 Labor Market Flows
All workers are assumed to be identical. Following Neugart & Storrie (2006), the work-
force is segmented into four different groups. As in the standard matching literature,
workers are either unemployed (U) or directly employed at a firm (regular employment,
R). Furthermore, workers can be employed at temporary employment agencies. Tempo-
rary employment agencies hire workers and have them in their pool (unassigned temporary
work, T ) with the aim at lending them to firms that use them in their production (assigned
temporary work, A).1 Unemployed may either find a regular job or become unassigned
temporary workers. Once in the pool of the temporary employment agency, the job in
state T may either be destroyed to unemployment with an exogenous rate δ or the tem-
porary worker becomes assigned to a firm. Moreover, temporary workers (assigned and
unassigned) search on-the-job for regular employment. It is assumed that their effective-
ness of search is higher compared to that of unemployed. This is reflected by parameter γT
and γA for unassigned and assigned temporary workers, respectively. Assigned temporary
workers may find regular jobs or their current position is destroyed with the exogenous
rate χ, meaning that they fall back to state T just being in the pool of the temporary
employment agency. Employment of regular workers is destroyed to unemployment by
the exogenous rate δ coinciding with the job destruction rate of unassigned temporary
jobs.2
Search is undirected, i.e. workers accept the first job offer they get whatever type it is.
Matching of firms and workers/agencies is formally described by the matching function
Mi = M(Vi, Si). (1)
The matching function exhibits constant returns to scale, is increasing in both arguments,
1This labor market set-up fits well to Central European countries such as France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Sweden (Arrowsmith, 2006).
2It is assumed that χ > δ. Due to its flexibility and a lack of employment protection instruments,
temporary agency employment is more affected by exogenous shocks than regular jobs.
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at least twice differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Mi denotes the instan-
taneous flow of hires for the different employment states i = T,A,R. The number of
vacancies posted in state i is denoted by Vi. The number of job-searchers in the respec-
tive state is given by Si. Firms post vacancies for regular and assigned temporary jobs,
while temporary agencies post vacancies only for unassigned temporary workers. Vacan-
cies posted in state i are filled with the rate M(Vi, Si)/Vi ≡ m(θi), while workers’ finding
rate for a job in state i is M(Vi, Si)/Si ≡ θim(θi). Variable θi ≡ Vi/Si reflects the labor
market tightness in state i. The number of job-searchers differs across the states. Un-
employed search for both, regular and temporary employment, while temporary workers
are allowed to search for regular employment on-the-job. Thus, there is an overlap in
the groups searching for different types of jobs. The total number of job-searchers for
unassigned temporary employment equals the number of unemployed, ST = U . Unas-
signed temporary workers look for assignments, SA = LT , where Li denotes the amount
of employed workers in the respective state. Moreover, all workers in states U , T , and A
search for regular jobs, i.e. SR = U + γT · LT + γA · LA. As temporary workers’ search
effectiveness differs from the search effectiveness of unemployed, γT · LT and γA · LA de-
scribe the effective number of unassigned and assigned temporary workers looking for
regular employment, respectively.3 There is no overall labor market tightness but for
each “submarket” separately. Thus, unemployed workers find jobs in regular employment
with rate θRm(θR), while unassigned and assigned temporary workers find regular jobs
with probabilities γT θRm(θR) and γAθRm(θR), respectively. Unemployed find unassigned
temporary jobs with probability θTm(θT ) and, once in the pool of the agency, become
assigned with probability θAm(θA). The labor market flows are depicted in Figure 1.
With help of Figure 1, the flows in and out of the different labor market states can
easily be stated formally. From the perspective of the firm, the flows at each instantaneous
3Total labor force N is normalized to unity. Hence, U +LT +LA +LR = 1, with U , LT , LA, and LR
denoting the unemployment and employment rates, respectively.
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Figure 1: Labor Market Flows
time interval are
L˙T = m(θT ) · VT + χ · LA − θAm(θA) · LT − γT θRm(θR) · LT − δ · LT (2)
L˙A = m(θA) · VA − χ · LA − γAθRm(θR) · LA (3)
L˙R = m(θR) · VR − δ · LR. (4)
In the steady state, the in- and outflows for the different states coincide, i.e. L˙T = L˙A =
L˙R = 0. Thus, the flows can be rewritten to
4
[δ + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR)] · LT = m(θT ) · VT + χ · LA (5)
[χ+ γAθRm(θR)] · LA = m(θA) · VA (6)
δ · LR = m(θR) · VR. (7)
Similar to the employment flows, the flows into and out of unemployment are
U˙ = δ · LR + δ · LT − θTm(θT ) · U − θRm(θR) · U. (8)
4The flow equations given here represent the firm’s perspective. They can easily be converted to the
respective flow equations from the workers side of view. To do so, use the respective job-searchers of
each state and the condition that the total labor force equals the sum of the workers of each state. The
equations are provided in Appendix A.1.
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As the change in the amount of unemployed is zero in steady state, i.e. U˙ = 0, equilibrium
unemployment is formally represented by
U =
δ(LR + LT )
θTm(θT ) + θRm(θR)
. (9)
Equilibrium unemployment does not directly depend on the labor market tightness in
state A, as the amount of assigned temporary workers only influences the structure of
employment, but not its rate. There is no direct channel from assigned temporary work
to unemployment or vice versa.
3.2 Goods Market
Households act as consumers in the goods market and, at the same time, as workers in
the labor market. Consumers are risk neutral in the aggregate consumption good. It
is further assumed that they have Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) preferences over a continuum
of differentiated goods. The goods demand function can be derived from the following
optimization problem households are facing:
max
cj,k
(∫
c
η−1
η
j,k dj
) η
η−1
with j = 0, ..., n and η > 1, (10)
subject to the resource constraint
Ik =
∫
cj,k ·
(
Pj
P
)
· dj, (11)
where j denotes the differentiated good and k the household. Further, cj,k denotes house-
hold k’s consumption of good j, while Ik is the real income of household k. Parameter
η gives the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated goods, while pj = Pj/P is
the firm’s price relative to the aggregate price level. The solution to the aforementioned
maximization problem and, thus, aggregate demand for good j is given by
Yj ≡
∫
cj,k · dk = p−ηj · I, (12)
with I ≡ ∫ Ik · dk being aggregate real income and P ≡ (∫ P 1−ηj ) 11−η denoting the price
index.
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3.3 Firms
In contrast to the basic matching model of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
(2000), we are dealing with large firms employing multiple workers. Each firm j produces
a single, differentiated final good. There are two reasons for using large firms instead
of one-worker firms. First, in models of monopolistic competition the optimal firm size
and output level are determined endogenously. Hence, restricting the firm size to one
worker conflicts with monopolistic goods market competition (for more details see Ebell
& Haefke, 2006). Second, assuming firm-level labor unions representing more than one
worker, it is natural to assume bargaining with large firms. Considering the production
technology of the firm, final goods are produced by using labor as the only input factor.
Workers can either be employed directly at the respective firm (regular workers), or they
are borrowed from temporary work agencies (assigned temporary workers). The amount
of regular workers employed at firm j is denoted by Lj,R, while Lj,A gives the amount of
temporary agency workers used in the production. The firm’s production technology is
described by
Yj = τ · [Lj,R + Lj,A]ρ with ρ ∈ (0, 1), (13)
where τ denotes an efficiency parameter and ρ captures diminishing returns to scale in the
production. Using this type of production technology reflects the idea that regular workers
and temporary agency workers are perfect substitutes. This is a reasonable assumption
because temporary agency employment is used in almost all branches, in particular in
blue-collar, low-skilled jobs to replace regular workers doing simple tasks. The reason to
replace regular workers doing simple tasks is all about lowering costs.
The instantaneous profit of a firm is given by5
pij = pj(Yj)Yj − wR Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R), (14)
with pj(Yj) representing the firm’s inverse goods demand function that can be derived
from eq. (12) and wR denoting the wage rate of regular workers. The fee the firm has to
5Appendix A.2 shows that this profit function is strictly concave and, hence, a profit maximum exists.
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pay to the temporary work agency is depicted by x, while h denotes the costs of posting a
vacancy in state A and R. Parameter ε describes regulatory costs or rather institutional
barriers associated with firm’s use of temporary employment, e.g. employment protec-
tion, the maximum period of assignment, synchronization ban and re-employment ban.
Next to institutional regulations there often are voluntary firm-level agreements between
employers and employee representations regulating the use of temporary agency employ-
ment. For instance, such agreements limit the share of temporary agency workers on all
employees within a firm or specify a maximum duration of assignment undercutting the
legal time limit. Furthermore, they may include commitments for transferring temporary
workers to regular contracts after a specific assignment period or expand the rights of
the employees representative committee with increasing temporary agency employment
used within the firm.6 Such non-institutional firm-level costs of temporary agency work
are increasing and convex in the number of employed temporary workers and reflected by
parameter σ > 1. Vj,R and Vj,A denote the number of vacancies firm j posts for regular
and temporary workers, respectively.
3.4 Workers
From the perspective of the workers, keeping in mind the labor market flows, the expected
value of regular employment is given by
rΨR = wR + δ · (ΨU −ΨR). (15)
Wage rate wR reflects the instantaneous inflow of being employed regularly, while the
second term depicts the loss from becoming unemployed weighted by its probability of
occurrence δ. The expected value of being unemployed is given by
rΨU = z + θTm(θT ) · (ΨT −ΨU) + θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨU). (16)
6An overview of such voluntary firm-level agreements used in Germany are provided by R. Krause
(2012).
10
Parameter z denotes the net income of being unemployed. The last two terms at the right-
hand-side (RHS) describe the expected gain from possible changes in the labor market
state. Similarly, the present discounted value of being in the pool of the temporary work
agency is
rΨT = wT + δ · (ΨU −ΨT ) + θAm(θA) · (ΨA −ΨT ) + γT · θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨT ). (17)
Parameter wT denotes the payment temporary agency workers receive for being in the
pool of the temporary work agency. By searching on-the-job they may improve their
position in the labor market and find regular employment with probability γT θRm(θR).
The worker’s expected value of assigned temporary agency employment is
rΨA = wA + χ · (ΨT −ΨA) + γA · θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨA), (18)
with wA denoting the wage temporary workers receive being assigned to a firm. Following
Neugart & Storrie (2006), it is assumed that the agency sets wT and wA in a way that
makes the worker at the margin indifferent between being unemployed, being in the pool
of temporary employment agencies or being assigned to a client firm, such that
ΨU = ΨT = ΨA. (19)
Even if this assumption is quite strong, it reflects the fact that temporary workers usually
have a rather weak bargaining position. Finally, applying this assumption, the value
functions (15) to (18) simplify to
rΨR = wR + δ · (ΨU −ΨR) (20)
rΨT = wT + γT θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨT ) (21)
rΨA = wA + γA θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨA) (22)
rΨU = z + θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨU). (23)
3.5 Labor Unions
It is assumed that all regularly employed workers are members of a union. Firm specific,
symmetric labor unions determine the wage rate for regular workers by maximizing the
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rent of its members. The rent of a union member equals the difference between the
expected value of regular employment and the outside option, which is the value of being
unemployed. Thus, the rent of a union member is given by ΨR − ΨU . As the union is
bargaining for all regular workers that are employed at firm j, the utility of the respective
labor union is formally represented by
Uj = [ΨR −ΨU ] · Lj,R. (24)
3.6 Temporary Employment Agencies
Temporary employment agencies pay a wage rate wA to temporary workers that are
assigned to a client firm and a wage wT to unassigned temporary workers that are only
in the pool of the agency. Further, the agency receives a fee x from a client firm for each
assigned temporary worker.
In contrast to firms, it is considered to have one-worker agencies. Each agency offers
one vacancy VT that can be filled by an unemployed. In case of a successful match, the
unemployed switches to the worker pool of the agency and waits for an assignment at a
client firm. The agency’s expected profit of posting a vacancy is
rΩV = −h˜+m(θT )[ΩT − ΩV ], (25)
where h˜ denotes the cost of a vacancy.7 Variable ΩT is the expected profit of having a
worker on hold, which is
rΩT = −wT + θAm(θA)[ΩA − ΩT ] + γT θRm(θR)[ΩV − ΩT ] + δ[ΩV − ΩT ]. (26)
Even in case of a filled vacancy, eq. (26), there is no positive flow income from filling a
vacancy. Having a vacancy filled is only worthwhile for the agency due to the potential
7Agency’s vacancy costs h˜ differ from the firm’s vacancy costs h with h > h˜. This reflects the fact that
firms usually look for workers with specific human capital, since they are more interested in long-term
employment relationships and stronger rules of employment protection apply, while agencies are able to
quit the employment relationship easier.
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assignment of the worker to a client firm. This is reflected by the second term at the
right-hand-side. In general, the last three terms denote the expected gains/losses due
to changes in the different labor market states. Finally, the agency’s expected profit of
assigning a worker to a client firm is given by
rΩA = x− wA + γAθRm(θR)[ΩV − ΩA] + χ[ΩT − ΩA], (27)
where x − wA denotes the flow profit in this state. Using eqs. (25) to (27), the agency’s
job creation can formally be described as
h˜
m(θT )
=
θAm(θA)(x− wA)− wT [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
[r + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR) + δ] · [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]− χθAm(θA) . (28)
4 Solution of the Model
Recalling the assumption that the value of being unemployed, being in the pool of the
temporary employment agency and being assigned to a client firm coincide, the wage rates
of assigned and unassigned temporary workers can be derived using the workers’ asset
functions. The bargaining problems between firms and unions and firms and agencies are
interrelated due to the substitutability of regular and temporary employment in the firms’
production technology. Hence, the whole bargaining game consists of two stages involving
the three bargaining parties firms, unions, and temporary employment agencies.
1. In the first stage, there are two simultaneous bargaining games. On the one hand,
the firm bargains with the agency over the fee the firm has to pay to the agency to
use temporary agency workers in the production process. As we are dealing with
one-worker agencies, the bargaining problem is of type individual bargaining. On
the other hand, the labor union determines the wage rate of regular workers. As
the union is responsible for all regular workers in a firm, the bargaining problem is
a collective one. For both bargaining games we use the so-called right-to-manage
model. The negotiation games are further specified in the respective subsections.
2. In the second stage, the firm uses its ”right to manage” to set the respective em-
ployment levels for regular and temporary workers.
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In order to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the whole bargaining game,
the two stages have to be solved by backward induction.
4.1 Wage Determination for Agency Workers
It has been stated that temporary workers are indifferent between being unemployed or in
either state of temporary agency employment, as represented by eq. (19). Thus, the wage
rates temporary workers receive can easily be computed by combining the asset functions
of temporary workers. Using eqs. (20), (21), and (23), the wage for unassigned temporary
workers turns out to be
wT = z + (wR − z) · ΓT (θR) where ΓT (θR) =
[
(1− γT )θRm(θR)
r + δ + θRm(θR)
]
. (29)
Similarly, using eqs. (20), (22), and (23), the wage for assigned temporary workers can
be computed as
wA = z + (wR − z) · ΓA(θR) where ΓA(θR) =
[
(1− γA)θRm(θR)
r + δ + θRm(θR)
]
. (30)
Wages are set as a mark-up over net unemployment income. The mark-up is denoted by
Γl(θR) with l = A, T . As the wage rate for regular workers is larger than the net income
of being unemployed, it is easy to see that the mark-up is only positive if the search
effectiveness parameters γT and γA are smaller than unity. Parameters γT and γA being
equal to unity means the search effectiveness of temporary workers to coincide with that
of unemployed. In this case, the wage rates of both types of temporary workers simplify
to the net unemployment income, i.e. wT = wA = z. It seems plausible to assume the
search effectiveness of unassigned and assigned temporary workers to be larger than the
search effectiveness of an unemployed. In this case, the resulting wage rates are smaller
than the net income of being unemployed. At first sight, this sounds counterintuitive.
However, it reveals the idea that unassigned and assigned temporary workers temporarily
accept a lower wage income since they hope to find a regular job with larger probability
compared to looking for regular employment while being unemployed. This is in line with
the idea of temporary agency work being a stepping stone into regular employment.
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4.2 Firm’s Labor Demand
The firm’s intertemporal profit maximization problem is given by
max
Vj,R(s),Vj,A(s)
Lj,R(s),Lj,A(s)
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)
{
p(Yj)Yj−wR(s)Lj,R(s)−εx(s)Lσj,A(s)−h [Vj,A(s)+Vj,R(s)]
}
ds,
(31)
subject to the laws of motion for assigned temporary and regular workers, eqs. (3) and (4),
and the goods demand and production function, given by eqs. (12) and (13), respectively.
Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian solving this intertemporal maximization problem
can formally be stated as
H = τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκI1−κ − wR Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R)
+ λ1[m(θR)Vj,R − δLj,R] + λ2[m(θA)Vj,A − χLj,A − γAθRm(θR)Lj,A],
(32)
with eqs. (3) and (4) denoting the equations of motion for the state variables Lj,R and
Lj,A, λ1 ≡ µ1e−r(s−t) and λ2 ≡ µ2e−r(s−t) being the current-value Lagrange multipliers and
Vj,A and Vj,R denoting the control variables of the intertemporal maximization problem.
Parameter κ ≡ (η− 1)/η, with κ ∈ (0, 1), reflects the firm’s monopoly power in the goods
market. The lower κ, the higher the firm’s monopoly power. The relevant first-order
conditions of the intertemporal maximization problem are
∂H
∂Vj,R
= −h+ λ1m(θR) = 0 (33)
∂H
∂Vj,A
= −h+ λ2m(θA) = 0 (34)
∂H
∂Lj,R
= ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − wR − δλ1 = rλ1 − λ˙1 (35)
∂H
∂Lj,A
= ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − σεxLσ−1j,A − λ2[χ+ γAθRm(θR)] = rλ2 − λ˙2. (36)
In the steady state it has to hold that λ˙1 = λ˙2 = 0 and ˙Lj,R = ˙Lj,A = 0. By substituting
eqs. (33) and (34) in eqs. (35) and (36), respectively, the first-order conditions turn out
to be
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − wR = (r + δ) h
m(θR)
(37)
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ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − σεxLσ−1j,A = [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
. (38)
Eqs. (37) and (38) determine the firm’s labor demand for regular and assigned temporary
workers. Theoretically, it may be possible that firms produce by using only one type
of labor. Appendix A.3 discusses the conditions for such corner solutions to appear.
However, in the following we assume that parameters are such that regular and temporary
employment are both positive, i.e. there is an interior solution.
It can be easily shown that
dLj,R
dwR
< 0,
dLj,R
dx
> 0,
dLj,A
dx
< 0 and
dLj,A
dwR
> 0.
The first and the third derivative follow directly from the first-order conditions (37) and
(38), respectively. In order to derive the cross derivatives, the two first-order conditions
have to be combined. Detailed calculations are provided by Appendix A.4.
4.3 Wage Determination for Regular Workers
The wage rate for regular workers is determined by collective bargaining. Since the union
represents all regular employed workers in a firm, it has a very strong bargaining position.
Thus, it is assumed that wages are determined by a special variant of the right-to-manage
model, namely the monopoly union model. Furthermore, it simplifies the formal analysis
of the model. Having monopoly power, the union has the exclusive right to set the wage
rate of regular workers. In response, the firm sets the corresponding employment level.
Thus, the union has to take into account the firm’s labor demand for regular workers,
that decreases in the wage of regular workers, as well as the labor demand for assigned
temporary workers that increases in the wage of regular workers.
The monopoly union maximizes its objective function, eq. (24), subject to the total
labor demand of the firm, given by eqs. (37) and (38). Using eqs. (20) and (23), the rent
of a single worker can be stated as
ΨR −ΨU = wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
. (39)
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The union’s maximization problem can formally be stated by the following Lagrangian
function:
L =
wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
· Lj,R + ξ1
[
r + δ
m(θR)
h− ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−1I1−κ + wR
]
+ ξ2
[
r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)
m(θA)
h− wR − r + δ
m(θR)
h+ σεxLσ−1j,A
]
.
(40)
The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂Lj,R
=
wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
− ξ1 · ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ = 0 (41)
∂L
∂Lj,A
= −ξ1 · ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ + ξ2 · (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A = 0 (42)
∂L
∂wR
=
Lj,R
r + δ + θRm(θR)
+ ξ1 − ξ2 = 0. (43)
Combining eqs. (41) to (43), the wage rate for regular workers is given by
wR = z + Lj,R
(
(ρκ− 1)ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A
(ρκ− 1)ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A
)
. (44)
Evaluation of the RHS of eqs. (44) reveals that the term in brackets is positive. Thus,
the union sets the wage rate for regular workers as a mark-up over the net income of
being unemployed. In Appendix A.5 it is shown that the wage rate set by the labor union
indeed maximizes its utility.
4.4 Determination of the Fee for Firm’s Use of Temporary Em-
ployment
The wage of assigned temporary workers is determined by bargaining between the firm
and the temporary work agency. As each agency employs only one worker, the bargaining
problem is similar to individual bargaining. In contrast to the monopoly union model,
which is used for the determination of the union’s wage claims, we assume that firms and
agencies bargain over the fee. This right-to-manage bargaining framework is used since
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the agency is, compared to the union, less powerful in the negotiation. Furthermore,
firms that hire more than one agency worker have to bargain with several temporary
employment agencies separately.
The decisive part of the individual bargaining problem is the modeling of the rent of
the firm in the Nash product. The firm treats each additional assigned temporary worker
as a marginal worker. Hence, the contribution of an additional assigned temporary worker
is just the partial derivative of the firms profit with respect to Lj,A. Since it has to be
taken into account that the labor demand of regular and assigned temporary workers are
mutually best responses, the firm’s profit is evaluated at the optimal labor demand for
regular workers, L∗j,R. Thus, the generalized Nash-bargaining problem between the firm
and the agency can be stated as
max
x
[
ΩA − ΩT
]β
·
[∂pi(L∗j,R)
∂Lj,A
]1−β
with β ∈ (0, 1), (45)
where β denotes the agency’s bargaining power. The agency’s rent, ΩA − ΩT , can be
computed using eqs. (25) to (27) and the free entry condition, ΩV = 0. It is formally
given by
ΩA − ΩT =
x− wA + wT + h˜m(θT ) · [γT θRm(θR) + δ − γAθRm(θR)]
r + χ+ θAm(θA) + γAθRm(θR)
. (46)
Taking into account that the number of regular workers is chosen to maximize the firm’s
profit, the marginal contribution of an additional assigned temporary worker for the firm
is given by
∂pi(L∗j,R)
∂Lj,A
= wR − σεxLσ−1j,A . (47)
Thus, the first-order condition of the bargaining problem in eq. (45) is
β ·(wR−σεxLσ−1j,A ) = (1−β)·[x−wA+wT+ h˜m(θT ) ·[γT θRm(θR)+δ−γAθRm(θR)]
]
·σεLσ−1j,A .
(48)
After some rearrangement, the optimal fee for temporary workers can be obtained as
x = β
wR
σεLσ−1j,A
+ (1− β)
[(
wA +
h˜
m(θT )
γAθRm(θR)
)
−
(
wT +
h˜
m(θT )
[γT θRm(θR) + δ]
)]
.
(49)
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In the case that the whole bargaining power is on the side of the agency, the fee equals
the first term on the RHS. Thus, the agency sets the fee in order to equate the unit costs
of regular and assigned temporary employment. In the case that the whole bargaining
power is on the firm’s side, the fee equals the term in corner brackets. It would therefore
hold, that the firm’s fee is exactly the difference between the agency’s total costs of an
assigned temporary job and the agency’s total costs of an unassigned temporary worker.
As the bargaining power is shared between the firm and the agency, the optimal fee is the
weighted sum of the aforementioned described terms.
5 Steady-State Equilibrium
The key endogenous variables θi, wi, x, Li and U for i = T,A,R are determined by the flow
equations (5) to (7) and (9), labor demand equations (28), (37) and (38), the equations for
workers wage rates (29), (30) and (44), and the fee firms have to pay for using temporary
agency employment in the production, eq. (49). Furthermore, in equilibrium the resource
constraint, that aggregate demand and aggregate production coincide, holds. Hence,
Y ≡
∫ n
0
Yj
(
Pj
P
)
dj (50)
is fulfilled. Due to symmetry of the firms in equilibrium, the firm’s price coincides with
the aggregate price level, hence, pi = 1, and eq. (50) simplifies to Y = nYj.
6 Numerical Simulation
Even if the equilibrium of the model can be depicted, it can not be solved analytically
but has to be solved numerically. We calibrate our model for Germany. Considering the
matching function, we use the following Cobb-Douglas type function
M = ζ · V 1−αi · Sαi , (51)
where α indexes the matching elasticity and ζ is a scale parameter denoting the efficiency
of the matching process. Following Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001), the matching elasticity
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is set to α = 0.5. Similar to M. U. Krause & Uhlig (2012), the scale parameter of the
matching function is ζ = 0.3.
As described in the outline of the model, unions are modeled to embody the full wage-
setting power. In contrast to that, we assume that in firm-agency bargaining over the
firm’s fee for using temporary agency employment, agencies have a rather low bargaining
power, set to β = 0.2. This is mainly based on two reasons. First, contrary to unions who
embody specific human capital and clearly differ from each other, firms may be rather
indifferent between the agencies to bargain with since the workers that are represented
by temporary work agencies perform more or less simple tasks. Second, the agencies’
relatively low bargaining power reflects the existing imbalance in the size of firms using
temporary agency employment and its supplier. While the workforce of almost all German
firms using temporary agency employment comprises more than 50 employees (Crimmann
et al., 2009), 82% of the temporary agencies have less than 20 employees in their pool
(Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2016a).
Reflecting the idea of temporary agency work being a stepping stone to regular em-
ployment, it is assumed that the search effectiveness of temporary agency workers is larger
compared to that of unemployed. Furthermore, we consider that the search effectiveness
of assigned temporary workers even exceeds that of unassigned temporary workers, be-
cause they already work at regular firms albeit they are not under their contract. This
idea is captured by the parameterization of γA = 1.2 and γT = 1.15.
Regular jobs and unassigned temporary jobs are destroyed with exogenous rate δ =
0.02 (M. U. Krause & Uhlig, 2012), while assigned temporary jobs are hit by exogenous
shocks with a rate twice as high, i.e. χ = 0.04. This reflects the fact that the average
duration of temporary jobs is quite short. For instance, Haller & Jahn (2014) report the
average duration of the majority of temporary jobs in Germany to be less than six months.
In the calibration exercise, net income of being unemployed is assumed to be related to
the wage rate of regular workers with a standard value of the replacement ratio of 60%.
The interest rate is r = 0.05, goods demand elasticity is chosen equal to η = 2.5, resulting
in κ = 0.6, and the production function parameter is ρ = 0.9. Parameter σ, assuring
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convexity of the cost function of assigned temporary agency employment and reflecting
firm-level costs of voluntary restrictions of temporary employment, is chosen to be σ = 1.2.
This ensures that the cost function is not too convex. The size of the labor force N and
the scale parameter of the production function τ are normalized to unity. According to
Christoffel et al. (2009), the costs of posting a regular or temporary job vacancy at the
regular firm are equal to h = 0.058, while its counterpart for unassigned temporary jobs
is assumed to be 80% of the costs of a regular vacancy. The value of regulatory costs of
temporary agency employment ε in firm’s production is chosen to be free, taking values
in the domain 0.5 to 1.4. Parameter ε can be considered as regulatory costs of temporary
employment compared to regulatory costs of regular employment, which are normalized
to unity. The reason for ε varying in a rather wide range is as follows: regulatory costs
of temporary employment may be smaller than for regular employment (ε < 1), because
there is either no or rather a weak employment protection. On the other hand, they may
be higher (ε > 1), e.g. due to the synchronization ban and re-employment ban. For the
calibration in this Section, regulatory costs of temporary agency employment are assumed
to be slightly higher than for regular workers, ε = 1.1. This reflects still existing legal
regulations, such as the maximum period of assignment or the equal pay obligation for
regular and temporary workers. Table 1 provides the full list of parameter values used in
the calibration.
The parameter values chosen fit well with the employment structure observable in Ger-
many. Temporary employment in almost all OECD countries is around 2% (Ciett, 2013).
The currently observed unemployment rate in Germany is about 6.5% (Bundesagentur
fu¨r Arbeit, 2016b). The model predicts an unemployment rate of 6.7%, almost coincid-
ing with the current value observed for Germany. Temporary employment (being the
sum of assigned and unassigned temporary work) equals 2.7%, while the rate of regular
employment is 90.6%.
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Table 1: Calibration parameter values for Germany
Parameter Description Value
α Matching elasticity 0.5
β Bargaining power of the agency 0.2
γA Search effectiveness of assigned temporary workers 1.2
γT Search effectiveness of unassigned temporary workers 1.15
δ Job destruction rate of regular and unassigned temporary jobs 0.02
ε Regulatory costs of temporary workers 0.5-1.4
ζ Matching efficiency 0.3
η Goods demand elasticity 2.5
ρ Production function parameter 0.9
σ Non-institutional, firm-level costs of using temporary workers 1.2
τ Efficiency of the production technology 1
χ Job destruction rate of assigned temporary workers 2 · δ
h Firm’s costs of posting a vacancy 0.058
h˜ Agency’s costs of posting a vacancy 0.8 · h
N Size of the labor force 1
r Interest rate 0.05
z Net income of being unemployed 0.6 · wR
7 Decrease in Regulatory Costs of Using Temporary
Workers in Firm’s Production
As indicated in Section 1, in recent decades there have been continuous deregulation efforts
concerning temporary agency work aiming at more flexible European labor markets. This
Section takes a closer look at the effects of such a deregulation, which is modeled as a
reduction in regulatory costs ε. Following the numerical simulation of Section 6, the effects
of legal deregulation on the workers’ wage rates and the firm’s fee for using temporary
agency employment, depicted in Figure 2, can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Workers’ wage rates decrease with increasing deregulation, while the
firm’s fee for using temporary employment increases in the degree of deregulation.
Furthermore, employment adjustments are depicted in Figure 3 and can be summa-
rized as follows:
Proposition 2. Legal deregulation of temporary employment leads to a monotonic re-
duction in unemployment as it lowers firm’s production costs and, thus, induces a higher
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overall labor demand. At the same time, it increases regular employment and, hence,
the degree of employment covered by union bargaining. Unassigned temporary employ-
ment also increases monotonically. However, there is a hump-shaped relationship between
regulatory costs and temporary agency employment used in firm’s production.
The firm’s decision of using regular or temporary employment in the production is
based on the marginal costs of the respective worker. Due to the substitutability of both
types of workers, in equilibrium marginal costs of regular and temporary workers have to
coincide and, furthermore, have to be balanced with marginal revenue. The optimality
conditions of the firm’s intertemporal optimization problem, eq. (37) for regular workers
and (38) for temporary agency workers, can be rearranged such that the left-hand-side
(LHS) gives firm’s marginal revenue and the right-hand-side denotes the marginal costs
of the respective type of worker:
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ = wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
(52)
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ = σεxLσ−1j,A + [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
. (53)
The marginal costs of both groups of workers consist of two parts each. The first term of
the respective marginal cost function reflects the unit costs of an additional worker, while
the second term represents the costs of posting a vacancy that are taken into account in
the intertemporal maximization problem.
Recall that the wage rate for regular workers, the fee, and the employment rates are
determined in two stages. In the first stage, unions set the wage rate wR and, simulta-
neously, agencies and firms bargain over the fee x. In the second stage, firms respond by
choosing the optimal employment levels of the respective type of worker based on the de-
termined wage rate and the fee. While unions take the employment responses for regular
and temporary employment into account, the one-worker agency neglects the effects of its
behavior on the employment level of assigned temporary workers.
A reduction in regulatory costs leads to a ceteris-paribus decrease in unit costs of
temporary agency workers which, in principle, increases the firm’s demand for this type
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of workers. The resulting increase in LA decreases the firms’ marginal revenue. Due
to the substitutability of regular and temporary workers, unions have to reduce their
wage claims as a reaction to the legal deregulation to prevent a substitution of regular
employment by temporary workers. This can also be seen from eq. (44). The resulting
reduction in union’s wage claims maintains the attractiveness of using regular employment
compared to temporary agency employment. Furthermore, the decrease in unit costs
increases the firm’s labor demand for regular workers. The increase in regular employment
cushions the firm’s increasing demand for temporary agency employment initialized by
the shock in ε. To state it differently, legal deregulation leads to an overall increase in
firms’ labor demand, which is not fully served by temporary agency employment but
(partly) substituted by an increase in regular employment. Figure 2a shows that wR
decreases monotonically, but with decreasing rate. Furthermore, Figure 3a shows that LR
increases monotonically, but with decreasing rate. The concavity of regular employment
stems from the convex costs of temporary agency employment. The higher the rate of
assigned temporary employment, the larger its impact on the marginal costs of temporary
workers. As the union considers the employment effects for both types of labor input in
the wage determination, it anticipates that the lower legal regulation and, ceteris paribus,
the higher assigned temporary employment, the higher its impact on the marginal costs of
assigned temporary workers. Thus, the substitution of regular employment by temporary
agency workers declines in LA as its impact on the marginal costs of temporary agency
employment increases. The resulting changes in the wage claims and, thus, employment
rate of regular workers are, therefore, weaker.
As stated above, the reduction in regulatory costs directly affects the marginal costs
of temporary workers, LHS of eq. (53), and ceteris paribus increases the labor demand for
this production factor. Although, as can be seen directly from eq. (49), the decrease in
regulatory costs encourages the agencies to increase the fee x and, by this, the agencies
profit. This increase cushions the reduction in marginal costs as it opposes the effect
initialized by the shock in regulatory costs. As agencies and firms bargain individually
and agencies are small (one-worker), the agency does not consider the firm’s employment
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(a) wage rate of regular workers (b) fee for using temp. workers
(c) wage rate of assigned temp. workers (d) wage rate of unassigned temp. workers
Figure 2: Reaction of fee and wages to changing regulatory costs of temporary employment
response considering temporary agency work to changes in the fee x. Even if the employ-
ment response of temporary employment may still be positive overall, the increase in the
fee x dampens the firm’s increasing labor demand for this employment type induced by
legal deregulation.
Furthermore, as the agency considers the firm’s demand for regular employment in
the determination of the fee x, it anticipates that the lower legal regulation, the lower
the firm’s adjustment of regular employment to changes in regulatory costs. The agency
assumes that with decreasing ε its scope to adjust x upwards increases. Thus, the fee
x increases convexly in decreasing legal regulation of temporary agency work. This is
depicted in Figure 2b. However, the agency does not take into account that the lower
legal regulation and, thus, the higher the demand for temporary agency workers, the
higher its impact on the convex unit costs of this production factor, see RHS of eq. (53).
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(a) regular employment (b) assigned temp. employment
(c) unemployment (d) unassigned temp. employment
Figure 3: Employment reaction to changing regulatory costs of temporary employment
These two reasons, the increase in x and LA’s increasing impact on marginal costs, finally
lead to the marginal costs of temporary agency employment being higher than the firm’s
marginal revenue and, furthermore, the marginal costs of regular employment. Thus, firms
react to the agencies behavior by a reduction in temporary agency employment in order
to balance marginal revenue and marginal costs, eq. (53). Overall, the aforementioned
mechanisms lead to the hump-shaped relationship of temporary agency employment and
regulatory costs, as shown in Figure 3b.8
Using the argumentation above, the adjustments of the wage rates of temporary agency
8Next to the effects on unit costs, the agency’s and union’s behavior also affects the second part of
the marginal costs, the vacancy costs that are taken into account in the intertemporal maximization
problem. For simplicity reasons, these effects are not considered in more detail in the argumentation
provided above.
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workers can be explained. The wage rates of temporary workers, given in eqs. (29)
and (30), positively depend on the wage rate of regular workers. The higher the wage
rate of regular workers, the higher the mark-up on unemployment income and, thus, the
wage rates of temporary agency workers. Hence, the behavior of the wages qualitatively
coincide with that of regular workers’ wages. This is depicted in Figures 2c and 2d.
Furthermore, Figure 3c gives the steady-state unemployment rate for varying values
of ε. Even if the composition of the firm’s increased labor demand is a priori unclear,
it is obvious that legal deregulation leads to an overall increase in total employment as
it decreases the costs of both inputs, regular and temporary workers. Thus, based on
the behavior of the employment rates of regular and assigned temporary workers, legal
deregulation of temporary agency employment leads to a monotonic decrease in overall
unemployment.
Figure 3d shows that unassigned temporary employment monotonically increases in
legal deregulation. Having in mind that there is a hump-shaped relationship of assigned
temporary employment and regulatory costs, this may be counterintuitive at first sight.
The reason is that legal deregulation leads to an increase in the fee x, which increases the
expected profit of the agency, eq. (27). More agencies will enter the market leading to
an increase in employment of unassigned temporary workers. Thus, legal deregulation of
temporary employment drives agencies to hoard idle labor waiting for an assignment in
a client firm.
Finally, we take a closer look at the evolution of firm’s profit and union’s utility due to
changing regulatory costs. This is depicted in Figure 4. Legal deregulation of temporary
agency employment leads to a more profitable production alternative for firms and damp-
ens union’s wage claims. Furthermore, it decreases the costs of using temporary agency
employment in the production. Thus, it is intuitive that the firm’s profit monotonically
increases in the degree of legal deregulation, as depicted in Figure 4a. Even if regular em-
ployment increases monotonically in legal deregulation, the wage rate for regular workers
and, hence, the rent of a single worker, decreases. The increase in regular employment
does not balance the loss in individual workers’ rent. Thus, the utility of the labor union
27
(a) firm’s profit (b) utility of the labor union
Figure 4: Evolution of firm’s profits and union’s utility due to changing regulatory costs
of temporary employment
decreases in legal deregulation, see Figure 4b. Even if the rate of regular employment and,
as a consequence, the degree of union coverage in the economy increase, unions suffer from
a more intensive use of temporary employment.
8 Summary and Conclusions
This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the general equilibrium effects of a legal
deregulation of temporary agency employment on negotiated wages and the employment
structure in a unionized economy. Large firms produce differentiated goods using labor
as the only production factor. Workers can either be hired directly by the firm (regular
workers) or by temporary employment agencies that lend the workers to the firms for
the production process. Both types of work are perfect substitutes. Regular workers
are represented by firm-level labor unions, which are assumed to be monopoly unions.
Temporary employment agencies are small (one worker) and bargain individually with
the firm over the fee the agency receives from the firm for borrowing temporary workers.
In response to the determined fee and the claimed wage, the firm chooses the respective
employment levels used in its production.
While there already exist contributions on labor unions and temporary employment
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agencies in the literature, our model is the first that combines temporary agency employ-
ment and the wage-setting behavior of labor unions in a frictional labor market to discuss
the agency’s impact on regular employment and the overall employment structure in the
economy.
The most striking result is that our model predicts that legal deregulation of tem-
porary agency employment does not lead to a steady increase in this employment type
implying a substitution of regular employment. Instead, there exists a hump-shaped re-
lationship between temporary agency employment and its degree of legal deregulation.
Whereas deregulation out of a high degree of regulation leads to an increase in temporary
agency employment, its rate decreases the more extensive legal deregulation is. Thus,
deregulation efforts of the temporary agency employment sector that occurred in most
European countries in recent decades, do not inevitable lead to a strengthening of this
sector, but may even lead to a declining rate of temporary agency employment in the
economy. At the same time, the rate of regular employment increases monotonically and
overall employment benefits from the deregulation.
The reason for the hump-shaped pattern of temporary agency employment and the
steady increase in regular employment is the cost structure of temporary agency employ-
ment. There are often voluntary, non-institutional firm-level agreements restricting the
degree of temporary agency employment used in the production. Thus, the costs of tem-
porary agency employment to increase convexly. The higher the rate of temporary agency
employment induced by legal deregulation, the higher the impact of the non-institutional
firm-level agreements on marginal costs. Because agencies are rather small compared to
the large firms they bargain with, they do not consider the consequences of the convex
cost structure in their negotiations. Combined with the fact that more attractive tempo-
rary agency employment forces the labor unions to reduce their wage claims for regular
employed workers to prevent employment losses and maintain the competitiveness with
temporary agency employment, temporary agency employment may even decrease in the
degree of legal deregulation, while regular employment increases monotonically.
These findings reject the main argument of opponents of temporary agency employ-
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ment that its legal deregulation leads to a substitution of regular employment and to a
higher share of precarious employment. Hence, the policy makers’ idea, that legal dereg-
ulation of temporary agency employment increases the flexibility of the European labor
markets and brings people to work who may not find regular employment, seems to be ver-
ified. Thus, legal deregulation of temporary agency employment aiming at an increasing
employment level may be continued.
Nevertheless, even if legal deregulation does not lead to a decline in the coverage of
collectively bargained wages in the economy, it leads to a reduction in workers’ wage rates
and a reduction in labor union’s utility.
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A Appendix
A.1 Steady-State Employment Flows
Using the steady-state conditions for each labor market state, the respective job-searchers
and the condition that U +LT +LA+LR = 1, the steady-state flows from the perspective
of the firm can be rewritten to obtain the respective flow equations from for the different
employment rates
LT =
θTm(θT ) · (1− LR) + [χ− θTm(θT )] · LA
δ + θTm(θT ) + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR)
(54)
LA =
θAm(θA)LT
χ+ γAθRm(θR)
(55)
LR =
[1− LT (1− γT )− LA(1− γA)] · θRm(θR)
δ + θRm(θR)
. (56)
The numerators denote the flows into and out of the respective labor market states.
Division by the respective denominator weights the flows by the average retention period
of a job in the respective state.
A.2 Concavity of the Firm’s Instantaneous Profit Function
Using eqs. (12) and (13), the instantaneous profit of the firm, eq. (14), can be written as
pij = τ
κ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκI1−κ − wj,R Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R), (57)
with κ = (η − 1)/η. The lower κ, the higher the firm’s monopoly power in the goods
market. The second order conditions are
∂2pi
∂L2j,R
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0 (58)
∂2pi
∂L2j,A
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A < 0 (59)
∂2pi
∂Lj,R∂Lj,A
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0. (60)
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While the necessary condition for a profit maximum is that the first-order conditions are
equal to zero, the sufficient condition for a profit maximum is
∂2pi
∂L2j,R
∂2pi
∂L2j,A
−
(
∂2pi
∂Lj,R∂Lj,A
)2
> 0. (61)
This can be seen to hold for κ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1:
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · [−σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A ] > 0. (62)
A.3 Corner Solutions in Firm’s Production
The decision of the firm, which type of labor input to use in the production, directly
depends on the marginal costs of each labor input. If the costs of an additional temporary
worker undercut (exceed) the marginal costs of a regular worker, the firm will only produce
with temporary workers (regular workers). Evaluating eqs. (37) and (38) at LA > 0 and
LR = 0, it turns out that that the firm will produce by solely using temporary workers in
the entire production, if
τκLρκj,RI
1−κ = σxεLσ−1A + [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
< wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
.
On the contrary, evaluating eqs. (37) and (38) at LR > 0 and LA = 0, it follows that the
final good will be produced by solely using regular employment, if
τκLρκj,RI
1−κ = wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
< [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
.
Choosing the cost function of temporary employment to be convex (but not too convex)
ensures to rule out the first case, since temporary employment becomes too expensive
at a certain level of production. On the other hand, a convex cost function implies that
temporary workers are relatively cheap at a low level of production, making the second
case less likely. Thus, the probability to obtain an interior solution crucially depends on
the convexity of the cost function of temporary employment.
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A.4 Derivatives of Firm’s Labor Demand
Using eqs. (37) and (38), respectively, it turns out that the labor demand decreases with
respect to its own costs, i.e. formally
dLj,R
dwR
=
1
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0 (63)
and
dLj,A
dx
=
σLσ−1j,A
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A
< 0. (64)
Taking eqs. (63) and (64) into account, it can be shown that the labor demand of regular
(temporary) workers increases in the fee x (wage of regular workers)
dLj,R
dx
= −dLj,A
dx
> 0 (65)
dLj,A
dwR
=
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · dLj,RdwR
σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A − ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ
> 0. (66)
A.5 Utility Maximization of the Labor Union
The representative labor union chooses its optimal wage wR by maximizing its objective
function, eq. (24), subject to the firm’s labor demand, determined by eqs. (37) and (38).
In the utility maximum, the second-order condition of the objective function Uj has to be
negative, i.e.
∂2Uj
∂w2R
= 2 · ∂[ΨR −ΨU ]
∂wR
· ∂Lj,R(wR)
∂wR
+ (ΨR −ΨU) · ∂
2Lj,R(wR)
∂w2R
< 0. (67)
Since
∂[ΨR −ΨU ]
∂wR
=
1
r + δ + θRm(θR)
> 0 (68)
∂Lj,R
∂wR
=
1
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0 (69)
∂2Lj,R
∂w2R
= −∂Lj,R
∂wR
· (Lj,R + Lj,A)−1(ρκ− 2) · ∂[Lj,R + Lj,A]
∂wR
> 0 (70)
∂[Lj,R + Lj,A]
∂wR
=
1
ρκ− 1(Lj,R + Lj,A)
(
wR +
r + δ
m(θR)
h
)−1
< 0, (71)
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the second-order condition is9
∂2Uj
∂w2R
=
1
r + δ + θRm(θR)
· ∂Lj,R
∂wR
·
[
2− (wR − z)ρκ− 2
ρκ− 1
(
wR +
r + δ
m(θR)
h
)−1]
. (74)
Rearrangement of the terms in corner brackets leads to
wR
(
2− ρκ− 2
ρκ− 1
)
> −
(
z
ρκ− 2
ρκ− 1 +
r + δ
m(θR)
2h
)
.
The right-hand-side is negative and the term in brackets at the left-hand-side is positive.
Hence, the second-order condition for the union’s utility maximization problem is indeed
negative.
9To calculate eq. (71), use
Lj,A =
[(
wR +
r + δ
m(θR)
h− r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)
m(θA)
h
)
1
σεx
] 1
σ−1
(72)
Lj,R =
[(
wR +
r + δ
m(θR)
h
)
1
τκI1−κρκ
] 1
ρκ−1
−
[(
wR +
r + δ
m(θR)
h− r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)
m(θA)
h
)
1
σεx
] 1
σ−1
, (73)
which can be derived by using the steady-state condition and eqs. (34) and (36) or rather (33), (35), (72),
respectively.
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